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The Effect of Job Flexibility on Female Labor Market 
Outcomes: Estimates from a Search and Bargaining Model
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This paper develops and estimates a search model of the labor market where jobs are 
characterized by wages and work-hours flexibility. Flexibility is valued by workers, and is 
costly to provide for employers. The model generates observed wage distributions directly 
related to the preference for flexibility parameters: the higher the preference for flexibility, the 
wider is the support of the wage distribution at flexible jobs and the larger is the discontinuity 
between the wage distribution at flexible and non-flexible jobs. Estimation results show that 
more than one third of women place positive value to flexibility, with women with a college 
degree valuing flexibility more than women with a high school degree. Counterfactual 
experiments show that flexibility has a substantial impact on the wage distribution but not on 
the unemployment rate. We comment on the implications of our approach for gender 
differentials in wages and schooling. 
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Anectodal and descriptive evidence suggests that work hours￿￿ exibility, such as the pos-
sibility of working part-time or choosing when to work during the day is a job amenity
particularly favored by women when interviewed about job conditions.1 On average women
spend more time in home production and child-rearing and less in the labor market.2 In
this paper we measure women￿ s preference for job ￿ exibility and its e⁄ects on labor mar-
ket outcomes by estimating a search and bargaining model of the labor market. We show
that preferences for ￿ exibility have implications on labor market participation and the ac-
cepted wage distribution. We also assess the desirability and welfare implications of policies
favoring job ￿ exibility using counterfactual analysis.
Our approach is to propose and estimate a search and matching model of the labor
market, which we describe in Section 3. In this model, jobs can be ￿ exible or not. Flexible
jobs are more expensive to provide.3 Workers have preferences over wages and ￿ exibility, and
meet with ￿rms to bargain over these dimensions. Wage heterogeneity arises exogenously
as a result of idiosyncratic match-speci￿c productivity and heterogeneity in preferences for
￿ exibility, and endogenously as a result of the bargaining process. We show that because
of the search frictions, the wage di⁄erential between ￿ exible and non-￿ exible jobs is not a
pure compensating di⁄erential.4
The identi￿cation of the model parameters using standard labor market data is discussed
in Section 4. The model predicts di⁄erent wage distributions for ￿ exible and non-￿ exible
jobs. Fixing the preference for ￿exibility, the two wage distributions have non-overlapping
support, and the size of the gap is measured by the monetary value of the preference for
￿ exibility (the compensating wage di⁄erential paid to the worker that marginally rejects
￿ exibility). The higher the preference for ￿ exibility, the wider is the support of the wage
distribution at ￿ exible jobs and the larger is the discontinuity between the wage distribu-
tion at ￿ exible and non-￿ exible jobs. This is a result of allowing workers to bargain over
1See for example Scandura and Lankau 1997.
2For example, using recent Current Population Survey data we ￿nd that more than 20% of women with
a college degree work less than 30 hours per week while only 1.6% of men in the same demographic group
do so. Women also generally choose more ￿ exible working schedule (Golden 2001). Our computations from
data from the American Time Use Survey 2008 reveal that women spend approximately 60% more time in
family related activity during the work day than men do.
3This cost can be justi￿ed on the grounds that ￿ exibility makes it more di¢ cult to coordinate workers,
or may require the hiring of a higher number of workers, which implies greater search and training costs.
4It is a compensating di⁄erential only for the marginal worker that is indi⁄erent between a ￿ exible and
a non-￿ exible job.
2wages and ￿ exibility options when meeting employers, which generates equilibrium wage
schedules that are functions of the match-speci￿c productivity, the outside option and the
￿ exibility regime. The ￿rms￿cost of providing ￿ exibility is also identi￿ed, because, at given
preferences, a higher cost implies fewer ￿ exible jobs in equilibrium.
We describe the data in Section 5. In the empirical implementation, we de￿ne a job
as ￿ exible when the worker provides less than 35 hours of work per week. Working hours￿
￿ exibility includes both the possibility of working less hours and the option of organizing the
working hours in a ￿ exible way at same amount of total hours worked. Some papers focus
on the ￿rst type of ￿ exibility by studying part-time work and hours-wage trade-o⁄s5. Data
limitations make it di¢ cult to study the second type of ￿ exibility. While our model and
estimation method apply to a general de￿nition of ￿ exibility, the data we use in the empirical
application are standard and force us to implement the usual de￿nition of ￿ exibility as a
part-time job.
Section 6 describes our estimation approach. We estimate the model using a simu-
lated method of moments to minimize a loss function that includes several moments of the
wage distributions of ￿ exible and non-￿ exible jobs and of unemployment durations. Our
estimates, presented in Section 7, ￿t the data very well. Results show that ￿ exibility is
important to women. Approximately 37 percent of college-educated women have a positive
preference for ￿ exible jobs valuing them between 1 and 10 cents per hour, but only about
20 percent of them choose such jobs in equilibrium. The value of ￿ exibility for women with
at most a high school degree is estimated to be equal or lower than 2.5 cents per hour.
Estimating a structural model of the labor market on a representative sample of U.S.
individuals allows us to evaluate some relevant policy interventions, which we present in
Section 8. We assess what are the overall welfare e⁄ects of the simple presence of the
￿ exibility option by comparing our estimated model with an environment where ￿ exibility is
not available. We then analyze policies that reduce the cost of providing ￿ exibility. Taking
into account equilibrium e⁄ects in these comparisons is crucial because the experiments
imply that some individuals observed in ￿ exible jobs might decide to work in non-￿ exible
jobs if ￿ exibility is not available, whereas some might decide to remain unemployed: the
preferences and the productivities of these workers are relevant to assess the overall labor
market impact of each policy. The introduction of frictions and the presence of preferences
over job amenities also imply that policy intervention may be welfare improving because
the compensating di⁄erentials mechanism is only partially at work.6
5See for example Altnoji and Paxson (1988) and Blank (1990).
6Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998) and Lang and Majumdar (2004) make this point explicitly.
3The experiments suggest that there is a substantial impact of ￿ exibility on the accepted
wage distribution. However, the impact on overall welfare and unemployment is limited.
This has an interesting policy implication. If the policy objective is to have an impact on
the wage structure but not on welfare - for example because the policy maker wants to
reduce the gender wage gap - then policies aimed at reducing the cost of the provision of
￿ exibility could be particularly e⁄ective.
2 The existing literature and our contribution
There is a vast literature that estimates the marginal willingness to pay for job attributes
using hedonic wage regressions.7 Authors have long recognized the limitation of the static
labor market equilibrium that provides the foundation for this approach. One alternative
approach, the use of dynamic hedonic price models (see e.g. Topel 1986), maintains the
static framework assumption of a unique wage at each labor market for given observables.
However, if there are any frictions that may make the market not competitive, hedonic
wage regressions produce biased estimates. The bias arises for two reasons. First, ￿ exibility
is a choice, therefore the standard selection argument applies: we may not always observe
the wage that workers choosing ￿ exible jobs would receive had they chosen a di⁄erent type
of job. This bias could be identi￿ed by observing the wage pattern of workers that choose
di⁄erent ￿ exibility regimes over their career. This approach is problematic because there are
few workers that change their ￿ exibility regime over their life time. Moreover, it is crucial
in this approach to control appropriately for job market experience, but it is di¢ cult to
do so if experience is a choice that is a⁄ected in part by preferences for ￿ exibility. An
alternative is to model the selection with appropriate exclusion restrictions, as for example
in our approach.
The second reason for the bias is that in hedonic wage models the compensating di⁄er-
ential mechanism is working perfectly so that the conditional wage di⁄erential is a direct
result of preferences. Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998) develop a search model of the
labor market showing how frictions interfering with the perfect working of a compensating
di⁄erential mechanism may bias estimates from an hedonic wage model8. The bias may be
7Rosen (1974) provides one of the ￿rst and most in￿ uential treatment of the issue; See Rosen (1986) for
a more recent survey.
8Usui (2006) is an application to hours worked that con￿rm their results. Lang and Majumdar 2004
obtain a similar result in a nonsequential search environment. Gronberg and Reed (1994) study the marginal
willingness to pay for job attributes estimating a partial equilibrium job search model on jobs durations.
Di⁄erently from us, they do not use ￿ exibility or hours worked among the job attributes and they do not
4so severe that the estimated willingness to pay for a job amenity may have the opposite sign
than the true one. The intuition is as follows. In an hedonic wage model a job amenity is
estimated to convey positive utility only if the conditional mean wage of individuals at job
with amenity is lower than the conditional mean of individuals without the job amenity.
However, in presence of on-the-job search and wage posting, ￿rms may gain positive pro￿t
by o⁄ering both a higher wage and the job amenity because doing so will reduce workers
turnover. The presence of the job amenity a⁄ects the entire wage distribution, which also
depends on the value of the outside option. The observed wage distribution may then ex-
hibit a positve correlation between wages and job amenity even if workers are willing to pay
for it. In our model, we obtain a similar outcome without on-the-job search but as a result
of the bargaining game: when workers and employers meet, they observe a match-speci￿c
productivity draw and then engage in bargaining over wages and job amenities. The rela-
tionship between productivity and wages depends on preferences for the job amenity in two
ways: directly (the compensating di⁄erential mechanism) and indirectly through the value
of the outside option (the bargaining mechanism).
Hence, despite exploiting a similar intuition as in Hwang, Mortensen and Reed (1998)
for solving the hedonic models bias, our model is di⁄erent with respect to the wage deter-
mination since we assume wage bargaining instead of wage posting.
The estimation of the impact of part-time or more generally of hours-wage trade-o⁄s
using hedonic wage model has been extensively studied. Mo¢ tt (1984) is a classic example
of estimating a joint wage-hours labor supply model. Altonji and Paxson (1988) focus
on labor market with tied hours-wage packages concluding that workers need additional
compensation to accept unattractive working hours. Blank (1990) estimates large wage
penalties for working part-time using Current Population Survey data but suggests that
selection into part-time is signi￿cant and that the estimates are not very robust.
There exist very few attempts at estimating models with frictions capable of recovering
preferences. Blau (1991) is one of the ￿rst contributions. He estimates a search model
where utility when employed depends both on earnings and on weekly hours of work. His
concern, however, is testing the reservation wage hypothesis and not estimating the marginal
willingness to pay for job amenities. Bloemen (2008) estimates a search model with similar
preferences. He concludes that the reservation wage signi￿cantly increases for weekly hours
above 50 while decreases in the 20 to 30 hours range. Both Blau and Bloemen￿ s contributions
assume that hours worked play a role because ￿rms post tied wage-hours o⁄ers. This
approach is di⁄erent form ours because we allow individuals to bargain over wages and
attempt to ￿t the wage distribution.
5￿ exibility. In addition, we estimate the ￿rms￿cost in providing ￿ exibility. The focus of
their policy experiments is also di⁄erent because we look at the impact of ￿ exibility on
labor market outcomes while Blau tests for the reservation wage property and Bloemen for
the di⁄erence between desired and actual hours of work.
Methodologically, our paper is related to papers that estimate search and matching mod-
els with bargaining, which are a tractable version of partial equilibrium job search models
allowing for a wider range of equilibrium e⁄ects once major policy or structural changes
are introduced.9 We extend the standard model in this class by including preferences for a
job amenity. A similar feature was implemented by Dey and Flinn (2005) who estimated
preferences for health insurance. Our model di⁄ers from theirs because the provision of the




We consider a search model in continuous time with each job characterized by (w;h) where w
is wage and h is an additional amenity attached to the job. In the empirical implementation,
h is a job regime related to ￿ exibility in hours worked. Workers have di⁄erent preferences
with respect to h and ￿rms pay a cost to provide it.
Workers￿instantaneous utility when employed is:
u(w;h;￿) = w + ￿h;h 2 f0;1g;￿ ￿ H(￿) (1)
where ￿ de￿nes the marginal willingness to pay for ￿ exibility, the crucial preference parame-
ter of the model, distributed in the population according to distribution H: The speci￿cation
of the utility function is very restrictive but we prefer to present the speci￿cation that we
can empirically identify. More general speci￿cations are possible, but the restriction that w
and h enter additively in the utility function is di¢ cult to remove if one needs to obtain a
tractable equilibrium in a search environment.
Workers￿instantaneous utility when unemployed is de￿ned by a utility (or disutility)
level b(￿). We allow for the possibility that individuals with di⁄erent taste for ￿ exibility have
9See Eckstein and van den Berg (2007) for a survey. Models in this class have been estimated to study
a variety of issues, such as: duration to ￿rst job and returns to schooling (Eckstein and Wolpin 1995); race
discrimination (Eckstein and Wolpin 1999); the impact of mandatory minimum wage (Flinn 2006); gender
discrimination (Flabbi 2009).
6di⁄erent preferences for being unemployed. There is no participation decision so workers
can only be either employed or unemployed.
Firms￿instantaneous pro￿ts from a ￿lled job are:
pr(x;w;h;k) = (1 ￿ kh)x ￿ w;k 2 [0;1] (2)
where x denotes the match-speci￿c productivity and k is the ￿rm cost of providing ￿ exibil-
ity.10 Cost k may arise from the need to coordinate workers in the workplace, and possibly
the need to hire a higher number of workers when ￿ exibility is provided, which generates
additional search and training costs. Crucially, the total cost of ￿ exibility kx is propor-
tional to potential productivity x: the potential loss of productivity that derives from lack
of worker￿ s coordination is higher when workers are more productive, and training costs are
higher when workers have higher skills.
The timing of the game is as follows: workers meet ￿rms following a Poisson process with
exogenous instantaneous arrival rate ￿.11 Once workers and employers meet, they observe
their types (de￿ned by ￿;k) and draw the match speci￿c productivity distributed in the
population from distribution G: x ￿ G(x): This is an additional source of heterogeneity
resulting from the match of a speci￿c worker with a speci￿c employer.
Matched ￿rms and workers engage in bargaining over a job o⁄er de￿ned by the pair
(w;h). The timing of the game is crucial for the bargaining game and for the search
process. Before an employer and a worker meet, they know their own type but not the type
of who they are going to meet: this implies that they will not direct their search toward
speci￿c agents. After an employer and a worker have met, types are revealed. This avoids
any problem related to the presence of asymmetric information in the bargaining game.
A match is terminated according to a Poisson process with arrival rate ￿. There is no
on-the-job search and the instantaneous common discount rate is ￿.
10Standard equilibrium search model assume a cost (usually homogenous) of posting a vacancy and then
free-entry with endogenous meeting rates (usually determined by a matching function) to close the model.
However these costs are very di¢ cult to identify using workers data, so as a ￿rst approximation we will
assume ￿rm have no cost of posting a vacancy.
11Keeping the arrival rate exogenous introduce a major limitation in the policy experiments because it
ignores that ￿rms can react to the policy and post more or less vacancies. It would be useful to use an
endogenous arrival rate but data limitations prevent the estimation of a credible ￿matching function" in our
application since we are looking at speci￿c labor markets where the scarce data on vacancy rates cannot be
credibly applied.
73.2 Value functions and the Bargaining Game
This problem can be solved recursively, and the value functions can be written as follows.12
The value of employment for a worker matched to a ￿rm is:
VE (w;h;￿;k) =
w + ￿h + ￿VU (￿)
￿ + ￿
(3)
The value of employment is the instantaneous utility ￿ ow (w + ￿h) plus the value of un-
employment, denoted by VU(￿) weighted by the probability associated to this event (￿), all
appropriately discounted by the instantaneous rates ￿ and ￿.







This is the ￿ ow utility from unemployment b(￿) plus the value of ￿nding a match weighted
by the probability associated to this event (￿), all appropriately discounted by the instan-
taneous rates ￿ and ￿. The value of ￿nding a match involves a decision: accept the job
o⁄er or not. Notice also that this job o⁄er involves not only a wage but the pair (w;h). To
solve this optimal decision rule we need to solve the bargaining game between the worker
and the ￿rm and then plug in the optimal wage schedule in equation (4): this is shown in
detail in the next section when we characterize the equilibrium.
For the ￿rm the value of a ￿lled position is:
VF (x;w;h;￿;k) =
(1 ￿ kh)x ￿ w
￿ + ￿
(5)
where again equation (5) has an analogous interpretation to worker￿ s value equations, noting
that in this case the value of the alternative state, an un￿lled vacancy, is zero because we
assume there are no costs of posting a vacancy.
Workers and ￿rm Nash-bargain over the surplus, using the value of unemployment














[w + ￿h ￿ ￿VU(￿)]
￿ [(1 ￿ kh)x ￿ w]
(1￿￿)
12The complete analytical derivation is presented in Appendix A.1.
8To compute this solution, we ￿rst condition on the ￿ exibility regime and then solve for the
wage schedule. When the parties agree to a ￿ exible job, the Nash-bargaining axiomatic
solution is given by:
e w(x;h) = argmax
w
S (x;w;h;￿;k) (8)
= ￿ (1 ￿ kh)x + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿VU (￿) ￿ ￿h] (9)
This wage equation states that the wage of a realized match is an average between the
value of the outside option (￿VU(￿)) and a portion ￿ of the total surplus of the match
((1 ￿ kh)x), minus an amount proportional to the job amenity ￿ exibility weighted by the
worker￿ s preference for it (￿h). The wage schedule, together with the previous value func-
tions, implies that the optimal decision rule has a reservation value property. Since equation
(9) shows that wages are increasing in x, equation (3) shows that the value of employment
VE (w;h;￿;k) is increasing in wages and equation (4) shows that the value of unemployment
VU(￿) is constant with respect to wages, then there exists a reservation value x￿ (h) such
that the agent is indi⁄erent between accepting the match or no:
VU(￿) = VE [e w(x￿ (h);h);h;￿;k] (10)
This in turn implies that workers will accept matches with productivity higher than x￿ (h)
and reject matches with productivity lower than x￿ (h). An analogous decision rule holds
for ￿rms and, because of Nash bargaining, there is agreement on the reservation values,
i.e. the value x￿ (h) satisfying (10) also guarantees that VF[x￿(h); e w(x￿(h);h);h;￿;k] = 0:





Substituting in (9), the corresponding reservation wage is:
w￿ (h) = ￿VU(￿) ￿ ￿h (12)
Notice that if ￿ exibility were not available (i.e. h = 0) the reservation values would
converge to the usual values found in the search-matching-bargaining literature:
w￿ (0) = x￿ (0) = ￿VU (￿) (13)
where the reservation wage is the discounted value of the outside option (￿VU(￿)). This is
also the solution that we obtain in the non-￿ exible regime since in the non-￿ exible regime
only the wage matters to determine the decision rule. When ￿ exibility is present, instead,
the optimal decision rule changes as a function of ￿ and k. The worker is receiving an
9amenity that she values more as ￿ increases: equation (12) then states that the worker is
willing to work at lower wages as long as ￿ exibility is provided (w￿ (0) > w￿ (1)): At the
same time equation (11) shows how on one side providing the amenity lowers the worker
reservation match value but on the other the cost incurred by the ￿rm increases it.
More speci￿cally, the choice of the ￿ exibility regime for the two agents is characterized
by the following reservation value property. Given a match productivity value x, the worker
and the ￿rm compare the two options they have: a job with ￿ exibility and a job without
￿ exibility. They are indi⁄erent when productivity is x￿￿ satisfying:
VE (e w(x￿￿;1);1;￿;k) = VE (e w(x￿￿;0);0;￿;k) (14)
VF (x￿￿; e w(x￿￿;1);1;￿;k) = VF (x￿￿; e w(x￿￿;0);0;￿;k)
Again Nash-bargaining implies that there is an agreement between worker and ￿rm: both
agents accept a non-￿ exible job if the match speci￿c productivity draw is above the threshold





Because a higher utility from ￿ exibility ￿ increases the threshold x￿￿ then for individuals
with higher ￿ it is optimal to accept a job with ￿ exibility over a larger support of x. On
the other hand, for a ￿rm with a high cost of providing ￿ exibility it will be optimal to o⁄er
job with ￿ exibility over a smaller support of x.
Depending on parameters, it is possible that no jobs with ￿ exibility are created. The
cost of providing ￿ exibility and the preferences for ￿ exibility have an opposite impact on the
reservation value x￿￿ and this threshold represents the point in which agents switch from the
￿ exible regime to the non-￿ exible. Therefore, if x￿￿ is lower than x￿ (1) there is no region
over the space of x where ￿ exible jobs are accepted. In the next subsection, we characterize
the threshold productivities in terms of the values of the fundamental parameters. This
characterization will then be exploited for purpose of empirical identi￿cation.
3.3 Equilibrium
A convenient approach to characterize the optimal decision rules is to compare the values
of the three reservation productivities de￿ned in (11) and (15): fx￿ (0);x￿ (1);x￿￿g: Recall
that x￿(0) is the reservation productivity value that makes it convenient to form a job
without ￿ exibility, x￿(1) is the reservation productivity to form a ￿ exible job, and x￿￿ is
the reservation productivity that makes a ￿ exible job preferable to a non-￿ exible job. We
10will characterize now these reservation values in terms of the parameters. The following
proposition holds:13
Proposition 1 There exists a unique ￿￿ such that:
￿ > ￿￿ () x￿ (1) < x￿ (0) < x￿￿
￿ = ￿￿ () x￿ (1) = x￿ (0) = x￿￿
￿ < ￿￿ () x￿ (1) > x￿ (0) > x￿￿
which is determined by the equation: ￿￿ = k￿VU (￿￿)
Note that we have characterized everything from the point of view of the worker but an
analogous result exists for the ￿rm: again the agreement between the optimal policies of
the ￿rm and the worker is guaranteed by the Nash bargaining solution.
This proposition de￿nes two qualitatively di⁄erent equilibria over two regions of the
support of the distribution H(￿).
Case 1. Consider ￿rst the case where parameters values imply ￿ > k￿VU(￿) and
therefore x￿ (1) < x￿ (0) < x￿￿. The optimal decision rule in this case is:
x < x￿ (1) reject the match
x￿ (1) < x < x￿￿ accept the match fe w(x;1);1g
x￿￿ < x accept the match fe w(x;0);0g
This optimal behavior results from maximizing over the values of each available choice. In
Figure 1 we report the value functions for given values of the parameters as a function of the
match-speci￿c productivity x: the optimal behavior will then be choosing the value function
that delivers the highest value for each x. The value of being unemployed is constant with
respect to x since it does not depend on wages (horizontal line). The value of being employed
both at ￿ exible and not ￿ exible jobs is increasing in wages and therefore, by Equation (9),
it is increasing in x. However, again by (9), workers in a non-￿ exible job receive more
surplus from additional productivity than workers in a ￿ exible job and therefore the slope of
equation VE (e w(x;0);0;￿;k) is steeper than the slope of equation VE (e w(x;1);1;￿;k). For
the same reason when the productivity is extremely low, workers at ￿ exible jobs are better
o⁄ because they receive the bene￿t of ￿ exibility: therefore equation VE (e w(x;1);1;￿;k)
has an higher intercept than equation VE (e w(x;0);0;￿;k). This con￿guration is common
at both types of equilibria; what is changing are the intersection points.





















Case 1: ￿ > k￿Vu(￿) Case 2: ￿ < k￿Vu(￿)
VE(e w(x;1);1;￿;k)
VE(e w(x;1);1;￿;k)
Figure 1: Di⁄erent equilibrium outcomes
Case 1 is described in the left panel of Figure 1 . For low values of the match-speci￿c
productivity x, agents prefer to reject the match because the value of unemployment is
higher. The point of indi⁄erence for switching state is reached at x = x￿ (1) where both
agents are indi⁄erent between leaving the match or entering a match with a ￿ exible regime
and a wage determined by the match schedule (9). Between x￿ (1) and x￿ (0) only jobs
with a ￿ exible regime are acceptable since the value of a job without ￿ exibility is lower
than both the value of job with ￿ exibility and unemployment. Notice then that without the
availability of such job amenity all this range of values of productivity would be rejected.
At x = x￿ (0) also non-￿ exible jobs start to become acceptable. However up to x = x￿￿ the
surplus generated by a ￿ exible job is higher than the surplus generated by a non-￿ exible
job, as shown by equation (14). Only for values of match-speci￿c productivity higher then
x￿￿ the optimal decision rule is to accept a non-￿ exible job with wage determined by (9).
Finally, by monotonicity of the di⁄erence (14), it is guaranteed that this will remain the
optimal decision rule for the rest of the support of x.
Given the optimal decision rules and conditioning on ￿, the value of unemployment can
be rewritten as:
￿VU(￿) = b(￿) + ￿
Z x￿￿
x￿(1)




[VE (e w(x;0);0;￿;k) ￿ VU(￿)]dG(x)
12that by substitution of the optimal wages schedules and value functions becomes:




















where notice that the value of unemployment is implicitly de￿ned by an equation that de-
pends only on parameters. Given that G(x) is a distribution, this equation has a unique
solution for VU (￿). Equation (17) completes the characterization of the behavior for indi-
viduals with ￿ > k￿VU(￿):
Case 2. When ￿ < k￿VU(￿), we have x￿￿ < x￿ (0) < x￿ (1), implying the following
optimal decision rule:
x < x￿ (0) reject the match
x￿ (0) < x accept the match fe w(x;0);0g
In Case 2 the added utility of ￿ exibility relative to the cost of providing it is not enough
to generate acceptable ￿ exible jobs: only non-￿ exible jobs with high enough match-speci￿c
productivity will be acceptable to both agents. Looking at the right panel of Figure 1, we see
that the point of indi⁄erence between the two employment regime, x￿￿, is actually placed
in a region where matches are not accepted. Only for an higher value of match-speci￿c
productivity agents prefer employment to unemployment. But this is the region above
x￿ (0) where the optimal choice are jobs without ￿ exibility. In conclusion, if the bene￿t
from ￿ exibility is too low, ￿ < k￿VU (￿); workers and ￿rm will only accept non-￿ exible
jobs.
Given the optimal decision rules and conditioning on ￿, the value of unemployment can
be rewritten as:
￿VU(￿) = b(￿) + ￿
Z
￿VU(￿)
[VE (e w(x;0);0;￿;k) ￿ VU(￿)]dG(x) (18)
that by substitution of the optimal wages schedules and value functions becomes:





[x ￿ ￿VU (0)]dG(x) (19)
This equation shows that the value of unemployment is implicitly de￿ned by an equation
that depends only on parameters but that does depend on ￿. To emphasize this fact, we are
13denoting here the value of unemployment as a constant ￿VU (0) and not as a function of ￿.
This result is important because allows us to partition the support of ￿ in a region that can
potentially generate acceptable ￿ exible jobs and a region that does not. Empirically, though,
it reduces identi￿cation because all the ￿ such that ￿ < k￿VU (￿) are equivalent in terms of
observed behavior. In other words, all the individuals with ￿ such that ￿ < k￿VU (￿) will
never accept ￿ exible jobs and they will all share the same reservation value x￿ (0). Therefore
we will not observe any di⁄erence in terms of durations and accepted wages distribution
which are the observed variables we use to identify the parameters of the model.
The previous value functions lead to a particularly convenient de￿nition of equilibrium:
De￿nition 2 Given f￿;￿;￿;￿;b(￿);k;G(x);H(￿)g an equilibrium is a value VU (0) that
solves equation (19) and a set of VU(￿) that solve equation (17) for any ￿ > k￿VU (0) in
the support of H (￿):
This de￿nition states that, given the exogenous parameters of the model, we can solve for
the value functions which uniquely identify the reservation values: the reservation values in
turn are the only piece of information we need to identify the optimal behavior. Empirically
it is also very convenient because - as we will see in more detail in the identi￿cation section
- we can directly estimate the reservation values and from them recover information about
the value functions and the primitive parameters.
The economic interpretation of the equilibrium is that only for relatively high produc-
tivity matches the higher wages compensates the worker for not having a ￿ exible job. This
is again a result of the bargaining process: since worker share a proportion of the rents
generated by the match there will always be a value of the rent high enough that more than
compensate the utility gain of working ￿ exible.14 On the other side, if a worker has a sig-
ni￿cant utility form working ￿ exible and the productivity is low enough, it will be optimal
to give up some of the relative small share of surplus to gain the job amenity ￿ exibility.
The range of productivities on which ￿ exible jobs are accepted is directly related to prefer-
ences since an higher ￿ means that the distance between the two reservation values x￿￿ and
x￿ (1) is becoming larger. In the Identi￿cation section will show how a similar implication
holds for wages generating a useful mapping form the data to the parameters. Looking at
Figure 1, left panel there is another interesting region that is worth to analyze: the interval
[x￿ (1);x￿ (0)]. This region is proportional to the region of matches that would have not
14To be precise, this is true if the sampling productivity distribution is not bounded above. If there is an
upper bound to productivity and the share at this upper bound is small enough, it is possible that some
high ￿-types will never work in a non￿ exible job.
14been created without the ￿ exible job option. In a sense this is an e¢ ciency gain of having
the option to o⁄er ￿ exible jobs: if the ￿ exibility option were not available, less matches
would be created leaving more un￿lled jobs and unemployed worker.
The equilibrium exists and it is unique because equations (17) and (19) admit a unique
solution. The proof involve showing that both equations generate a contraction mapping:
it is relatively straightforward in this case since we are integrating positive quantities on a
continuos probability density function.
Di⁄erent values of the preference for ￿ exibility ￿ imply di⁄erent con￿gurations of the
equilibrium joint distribution of wages and ￿ exibility regimes. For example, we can have
three completely di⁄erent ￿ exibility regimes depending on preferences in the following way.
First, if there is only one type of worker with 0 ￿ ￿ < k￿VU(0), then in equilibrium we
observe only non-￿ exible jobs. Second, if there is only one type with k￿VU(￿) ￿ ￿ and
the G(x) distribution has a ￿nite upper-bound x such that ￿ > kx then in equilibrium we
observe only ￿ exible jobs. Finally, if there are two types of workers, one with 0 ￿ ￿1 <
k￿VU (0) and the other with k￿VU (￿2) ￿ ￿2, then the equilibrium displays both ￿ exible and
non-￿ exible jobs where the proportion of the two types of jobs depends on the proportion
of the two types of workers in the population.
A larger number of types, a di⁄erent combination of them or a continuous distribution of
them can ￿t other con￿guration of observables. In particular, as we will show in the following
section, the model can ￿t the con￿guration we observe in the data, i.e. a combination of
￿ exible and non-￿ exible regimes on an overlapping support of accepted wages.
4 Identi￿cation
In this section we discuss the identi￿cation of the fundamental parameters to be estimated:
the bargaining power parameter ￿, the parameters of the distribution over the match-
speci￿c productivities G(x), the match arrival rate ￿ and termination rate ￿, the discount
rate ￿, the ￿ ow value during unemployment b, the cost of providing ￿ exibility k, and the
distribution over preferences for ￿ exibility H(￿).
We use a representative sample of the U.S. labor market containing the following vari-
ables: accepted wages, unemployment durations and an indicator of ￿ exibility (see section
5 for details about the data construction). Thanks to the model structure, this relatively
limited amount of information allows for the estimation of all the relevant parameters:
if the drawback of our approach is the reliance on some functional form assumptions for
identi￿cation, one advantage is the relatively mild data requirement we need for estimation.
154.1 Identi￿cation of the standard search model parameters
First, we assume symmetric Nash bargaining, which implies a Nash-bargaining coe¢ cient ￿
equal to 1/2. This assumption is common in the literature because separate identi￿cation
of the bargaining power coe¢ cient is di¢ cult without demand side information.15
Flinn and Heckman (1982) proved identi￿cation of a similar model without preferences
for the job amenity. They show that unemployment durations identify the hazard rate out
of unemployment (the arrival rate time the probability of accepting the match) and the
termination rate of a job. They also show that the accepted wage distribution identify the
parameters of the match distribution G(x) only if an appropriate parametric assumption is
made. The parametric assumption is necessary because we do not observe matches below
the reservation wage. Finally, the parameters ￿ and b can only be jointly identi￿ed. This
is because they both enter the likelihood (i.e. they contribute to the mapping from the
data to the parameters) only multiplied through the discounted value of unemployment
(￿VU(￿)) which, however, is not a primitive parameter, but an implicit function of various
parameters (see equations (17) and (19)).16 This discounted value of unemployment ￿VU(￿)
is identi￿ed using the minimum observed wage in the sample.17
4.2 Identi￿cation of the parameters that are speci￿c to this model
Our model contains two additional sets of parameters left to be identi￿ed and which are
not commonly found in the literature: the distribution of preferences for ￿ exibility, ￿ and
the cost of providing ￿ exibility k.
We assume a discrete distribution H(￿) with a ￿nite number of values ￿j, and call pj the
frequency of individuals with preference for ￿ exibility ￿j in the population. It is common
in the literature to refer to the di⁄erent values of ￿0
js as ￿types￿of workers. We now show
how such preferences a⁄ect the wage distribution, which should provide an intuition for
why these parameters are identi￿ed.
15See Flinn (2006) and Eckstein and Wolpin (1995).
16Postel-Vinay and Robin (2002) is one of the few articles providing direct estimates of the discount rate
within a search framework. Their model is however not comparable to ours because the discount rate includes
both ￿impatience￿(as in our model) and risk aversion. They generate high estimates for this parameter:
about 12% for the skilled group and up to 65% for some unskilled groups in some speci￿c industries.
17To perform policy experiment we need the instantaneous value of unemployment b separate from the
discount factor ￿: We follow the literature in ￿xing ￿; and compute b residually using Equation (17). We use
for ￿ a yearly discount rate of 5%. Flinn and Heckman (1982) use a value of 5% and 10% and Flinn (2006)
uses 5%. We performed sensitivity analysis and found that doubling it to 10% does not make an appreciable
di⁄erence on the results.
16First, assume there is only one type such that all workers have the same preference
for ￿ exibility ￿ satisfying ￿ > k￿VU(￿): The support of G(x) is equal to the positive
real line. As shown in de￿nition 2, the equilibrium generates a distribution of wages over
both ￿ exible and non-￿ exible regimes and the accepted wage distribution does not have
a connected support. This is due to the fact that accepted wages are obtained from the
productivity distribution by the equilibrium wage schedule (9). The lower bound of the
accepted wage distribution is given by the wage of the worker that marginally accepts a
￿ exible job, e w(x￿ (1);1); the maximum accepted wage in a ￿ exible job is e w(x￿￿;1). Between
these two bounds the wage distribution is governed by e w(x;1): For x > x￿￿, however, the
wage distribution is governed by e w(x;0) so that on the region (e w(x￿￿;1); e w(x￿￿;0)) the
accepted wage distribution does not place any probability mass. This means there is a
gap in the support of the accepted wage distribution. The three bounds (i.e. the three
truncation points that correspond to the two ￿ exibility regimes) are by de￿nition equal to:
e w(x￿ (1);1) = ￿VU (￿) ￿ ￿ (20)
e w(x￿￿;1) = ￿ (1 ￿ k)
￿
k
+ (1 ￿ ￿)[￿VU (￿) ￿ ￿] (21)
e w(x￿￿;0) = ￿
￿
k
+ (1 ￿ ￿)￿VU(￿) (22)
Equating the three truncation points in the support to their de￿nition generates three
equations in three unknowns. Solving we obtain the following estimators:
b ￿ = e w(x￿￿;1) ￿ e w(x￿￿;0) (23)
\ ￿VU(￿) = b ￿ + e w(x￿ (1);1) (24)
b k = ￿b ￿
h
e w(x￿￿;0) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿) \ ￿VU (￿)
i￿1
(25)
where the size of the discontinuity in the wage support identi￿es the preference for ￿ exibility;
given a value of ￿; the minimum wage in the sample identi￿es the discounted value of
unemployment; and given ￿, the location of the discontinuity identi￿es k:
While we do observe workers in both ￿ exibility regimes in the data, we do not observe
discontinuous wage supports and, moreover, we observe the wage supports of ￿ exible and
non-￿ exible workers overlap. Therefore, a model with only one type cannot ￿t the data. This
shows that the wage supports over the ￿ exibility regimes contain identifying information
about which and how many types should be present in the model to match the data.
As a second step, assume there is more than one type. If this is the case, it is possible
that the highest wage of a worker of one type in a ￿ exible job is greater than the lowest
wage of a worker from a di⁄erent type in a non-￿ exible job. The size of the overlap and
17the proportion of workers in ￿ exible and non-￿ exible jobs in the overlap is informative
about the proportion of workers that belong to each type and the value of their preference
for ￿ exibility. The presence of more types then ￿smoothes out￿ the discontinuity in the
accepted wage distribution. Multiple types generate a mixture of wage distributions with
the same features of the wage distribution with discontinuous support described above.
The following example clari￿es how the model can ￿t the con￿guration we ￿nd in the
data which is characterized by the following features: (i) both ￿ exible and non-￿ exible
regimes are accepted; (ii) the supports of the accepted wage distributions do not exhibit
discontinuities; and (iii) the accepted wage supports of ￿ exible and non-￿ exible workers
overlap.
EXAMPLE:
If there are three types:
￿0 = 0
￿1 : ￿1 > k￿VU (￿1)
￿2 > ￿1 : ￿2 > k￿VU (￿2)
then, a feasible con￿guration of the reservation wages is:18
e w(x￿ (0;￿0);0) < e w(x￿￿ (￿1);0) < e w(x￿￿ (￿2);0)
e w(x￿ (1;￿2);1) < e w(x￿ (1;￿1);1) < e w(x￿￿ (￿1);1) < e w(x￿￿ (￿2);1)
generating three intervals in the support of the accepted wages at job with and without
￿exibility. The equilibrium implies that the mapping from observed wages and the probability
of being of a given type (denoted by ￿j (wi;hi;p)) is as follows:
18By feasible con￿guration we mean an ordering of the three reservation values that may be realized in
equilibrium given a number of types. Note that the number of types does not necessarily uniquely identify
a given con￿guration; only given a complete set of parameters we can ￿nd the unique con￿guration of the
realized in equilibrium.
18Observed fwi;hig ￿0 (wi;hi;p) ￿1 (wi;hi;p) ￿2 (wi;hi;p)
hi = 1 and
e w(x￿ (1;￿2);1)￿ wi<e w(x￿ (1;￿1);1) 0 0 1





e w(x￿￿ (￿1);1)￿ wi<e w(x￿￿ (￿2);1) 0 0 1
hi = 0 and
e w(x￿ (0;￿0);0)￿ wi<e w(x￿￿ (￿1);0) 1 0 0





e w(x￿￿ (￿2);0)￿ wi 1 ￿ p1￿p2 p1 p2
In this example, in some cases the wage and ￿ exibility regime is enough to identify the
agent￿ s type. For example, if we observe an individual employed in a ￿ exible job with a
wage higher than e w(x￿ (1;￿2);1) but smaller than e w(x￿ (1;￿1);1) we could conclude she
belongs to the ￿2￿ type. The same is true for individuals working in non-￿ exible jobs with
a wage lower than e w(x￿￿ (￿1);0): they belong to the ￿0￿ type. For other regions in the
support we cannot have this one-to-one mapping but we can still obtain some information
about the probability of belonging to a certain type. For example, individuals in a ￿ exible
job with wages in the [e w(x￿ (1;￿1);1);e w(x￿￿ (￿1);1)] interval will belong to the ￿1￿type
with probability
p1
p1+p2 and to the ￿2￿type with probability
p2
p1+p2: All these reservation
wage values are themselves a function of the primitive parameters we want to estimate.
Note that ￿ is not identi￿ed for all types such that ￿ < k￿VU (0). The reason is that
in this case all accepted jobs are non-￿ exible and ￿ exibility has no impact on these types
of workers. We will denote the ￿ such that this is the case with ￿0 and we are forced to
normalize its value. In the estimation we obtain values of ￿ that are quite low (between
0.1 and 0.01) and we know that ￿0 must be smaller than the smallest estimated ￿. We
therefore normalize ￿0 to zero, which has a negligible impact on the results. The same can
be said of ignoring the possibility of more than one type in the ￿ < k￿VU (0) region: since
the ￿￿values in this regions are so compressed, even if more types were allowed they would
be very similar because the types are fully described by their ￿0s.
5 Data
For identi￿cation purposes, we need a data set reporting at least accepted wages, unem-
ployment duration, a ￿ exibility regime indicator and some additional controls to insure a
degree of homogeneity to the estimation sample.
Finding a good ￿ exibility indicator is a di¢ cult task: ideally we would like to have a
19Females College High School
N. ￿ exible 264 240
N. non-￿ exible 1058 854
Average wage, ￿ exible 22.5 (14.2) 10.3 (4.3)
Average wage, non-￿ exible 23.4 (10.3) 13.9 (5.9)
Wage range, ￿ exible 2.4-70 2.13-26.7
Wage range, non-￿ exible 7-57.7 3.65-38.5
Avg. hours worked, ￿ exible 21.3 (7.7) 23.4 (7.6)
Avg. hours worked, non-￿ exible 42.7 (6.4) 40.5 (3.8)
N. unemployed 34 72
Avg. unemployment duration 4.4 (5.2) 4.6 (5.9)
Table 1: Descriptive statistics (standard deviations in parenthesis)
variable indicating if the worker can freely choose how to allocate her working hours. In
principle this type of information is observable (for example, some labor contracts have a
￿extime option allowing workers to enter and exit the job at her chosen time, or allowing
workers to bundle extra working hours to gain some days o⁄). However, there is lack of
an homogenous de￿nition across ￿rms and industries of these types of contract. Moreover,
we prefer to provide estimates based on a representative sample of the population than on
speci￿c ￿rms or occupations. For this reason we use a very limited but at least transparent
and comparable de￿nition of ￿ exibility that allows us to use a standard and representative
sample of the U.S. labor market. The de￿nition of ￿ exibility we use is based on hours worked
under the assumption that working fewer hours per week is a way to obtain the type of
￿ exibility we are interested in. For comparability across workers with di⁄erent ￿ exibility
choices, wages are measured in dollars per hour.
The data is extracted from the Annual Social and Economic Supplement (ASES or
March supplement) of the Current Population Survey (CPS) for the year 2005. We consider
only women that declare themselves as white, in the age range 30-55 years old, and that
belong to two educational levels: high school completed (high school sample) and at least
college completed (college sample). To avoid outliers and top-coding issues we trim hourly
earnings excluding the top and the bottom 1% of the raw data.
The variables that we extract are: on-going unemployment durations observed for in-
dividuals currently unemployed (ti); accepted wages observed for individuals currently em-
ployed (wi) and the ￿ exibility regime (hi) where the worker is assumed to be in a ￿ exible
job if working less than 35 hours per week. We obtain a sample whose descriptive sta-
20tistics are presented in Table 1. Accepted earnings are measured in dollars per hour and
unemployment durations in months.
6 Estimation
The minimum observed wage is a strongly consistent estimator of the reservation wage19.
In our model we can exploit this property of observed minimum wages both at ￿ exible
and at non-￿ exible jobs because they refer to the reservation wage of two di⁄erent types of
individuals: the lowest accepted wage at non-￿ exible jobs is a strongly consistent estimator
for the reservation wage of workers￿type such that ￿ < k￿VU(￿) while the lowest accepted
wage at ￿ exible jobs is a strongly consistent estimator for the reservation wage of workers￿
type such that ￿ > k￿VU(￿).
Therefore, the ￿rst step of our estimation procedure uses equation (12) to obtain the
following strongly consistent estimators:
\ ￿VU (0) = min
i
fwi : hi = 0g (26)
\ ￿VU (￿j) ￿ ￿j = min
i
fwi : hi = 1g
The remaining parameters are estimated in a second step using a Simulated Method of
Moments (SMM) procedure. The moments we match are the means and standard deviations
of wages at ￿ exible and non-￿ exible jobs over various percentile ranges de￿ned on accepted
wages at non-￿ exible jobs.20 To these moments we add the mean and standard deviations
of unemployment durations and the fraction of workers that are employed in ￿ exible jobs
over the same percentile ranges. A complete list of the simulated moments is in Appendix
A.3. Matching wage moments and the proportions of ￿ exible and non-￿ exible jobs over the
same wage supports should capture the ￿smoothed out￿discontinuities with the overlapping
distributions of wages in ￿ exible and non-￿ exible jobs generated by a model with multiple
types as illustrated in the identi￿cation section.
We assume G(x) is lognormal with parameters (￿;￿).21 Given parameter vector ￿ ￿
19See Flinn and Heckman (1982)
20In principle, one could attempt a maximum likelihood approach. This is di¢ cult in our model because
each type ￿ such that ￿ > k￿VU(￿) de￿nes a parameter-dependent support over ￿ exible and non-￿ exible
jobs and the ￿rst step allows the estimation of only one such type ￿. The support of the variables over which
the likelihood is de￿ned depends on parameters and therefore a standard regularity condition is violated.
21This is the most commonly assumed distribution in this literature because it satis￿es conditions for the
identi￿cation of its parameters and it provides a good ￿t for observed wages distributions.
21f￿;￿;￿;￿;k;￿;p;￿VU (￿￿j)g, in the second step the estimator is:












where ￿N is the vector of the sample moments obtained by our sample of dimension N while
￿R
￿
￿j \ ￿VU (0); \ ￿VU (￿j) ￿ ￿j
￿
is the vector of the corresponding moments obtained from a
simulated sample of size R. Bold types represent vectors of variables: for example t is the
vector of the unemployment durations ti. The weighting matrix W is a diagonal matrix
with elements equal to the inverse of the bootstrapped variances of the sample moments.
To perform policy analysis, we ￿x the discount rate ￿ to 0.05 and recover b(￿) using
the equilibrium equations (17) and (19) (see footnote 17).
7 Results
The model is estimated separately for women with a high school degree, and women with
at least a college degree. Estimated parameters are reported in Table 2. The speci￿cation
includes three types and it is very similar to the Example presented in the Section 4. The
type that only accepts non-￿ exible jobs has value ￿0 normalized to zero. Three types is the
minimum number of types generating both ￿ exible and non ￿ exible jobs that overlaps over
their wage support and that guarantees smoothness of the accepted earnings distribution.22
The parameter estimates ￿t the data very well (see the table in the Appendix A.3).
Observe ￿rst that arrival rates, termination rates, and the two parameters of the lognormal
distribution of match-speci￿c productivity are comparable to the results obtained in the
literature.23 The arrival rates imply that agents receive an o⁄er, which they may accept or
reject, about every 4 months on average. The sampling productivity distribution parameters
(￿;￿) imply that the average productivity for college graduates is almost 40 dollars per hour
while the average productivity for high school graduates is about 23 dollars per hour. The
22We estimated the model with four types but the estimates did not generate a signi￿cant improvement
of the model ￿t: the additional type estimate of ￿ converges in value to the ￿ of one of the existing type
and its proportion in the population is estimated to be negligible.
23See for example Flabbi (2009) and Bowlus (1997) who estimated comparable search models on samples
of women. Flabbi used CPS 1995 data on white college graduates ￿nding a very similar arrival rate and
slighlty lower average productivity in the presence of employers￿discrimination. Bowlus used a NLSY 1979
sample of college and high school women ￿nding a slighlty lower hazard rate from unemployment in the
presence of a non-partecipation state.
22Parameter College High School
￿ 3.5343 (0.0069) 3.0107 (0.0192)
￿ 0.5378 (0.0043) 0.4841 (0.0188)
￿ 0.0057 (0.0000) 0.0136 (0.0000)
￿ 0.2288 (0.0023) 0.2196 (0.0014)
￿1 0.1035 (0.0488) 0.0100 (0.0030)
p1 0.1256 (0.0073) 0.2084 (0.0221)
￿2 0.0100 (0.0000) 0.0255 (0.0002)
p2 0.2437 (0.0075) 0.1641 (0.0415)
k 0.0004 (0.00003) 0.0006 (0.00002)
￿VU (0) 7.0000 (0.0000) 3.6500 (0.0000)
￿VU (￿1) 15.3092 (4.3083) 3.9059 (2.7685)
￿VU (￿2) 2.4100 (0.0000) 2.1555 (0.0002)
Loss function 46.561 3.671
N 1,356 1,166
Table 2: Estimation results (bootstrapped standard errors from 30 samples in parenthesis)
reservation wage values are to be interpreted as measured in dollars per hour, and they
appear to be within a reasonable range.
The ￿ exibility-related parameters are more di¢ cult to compare to previous literature,
but their values look plausible: about 37% of college educated women are willing to pay
between 1 and 10 cents per hour to work in ￿ exible jobs. Firms￿cost of providing ￿ exibility is
0.04% of the hourly potential productivity. A similar proportion of women with high school
education value ￿ exibility but they are willing to pay a lower dollar amount (between 1 and
2.5 cents per hour) while ￿rms face a higher cost of providing it, about 0.06% of the hourly
potential productivity.
We have a very limited model of the ￿rms side of the market so it is di¢ cult to ￿nd
an explanation about why ￿rms employing low skilled workers may have higher cost of
￿ exibility. A lower cost might seem intuitive on this group since their lower skills makes
them easier to substitute. However, we can think at least one explanation consistent with
our results: secretarial or manual jobs are often performed in teams and require a higher
need for coordinating work-hours among workers than professional jobs.
The di⁄erence between the parameter estimates on high school and college graduates
suggests that women might choose schooling in part to accommodate a preference for job
23￿ exibility. Schooling is costly but may provide access to jobs where the relative cost of
￿ exibility is lower. This might provide a partial explanation to the puzzle of why women
have lower wages than men, but acquire more schooling.24
To further clarify the role of ￿ exibility on labor market outcomes we turn to the com-
putation of counterfactual experiments.
8 Policy Experiments
We present three types of experiments. For each experiment we compute the new equi-
librium and use it to generate a sample of wages and unemployment durations which we
compare to a sample derived from the parameter estimates reported in Table 2 from Section
7 (the benchmark model). In each experiment we generate a sample of 100,000 observations
and compute various statistics.
To emphasize changes with respect to the benchmark model we will present results as
ratio with respect to it. To provide a point of reference, Table 3 presents the values of
the corresponding statistics in the benchmark case. The ￿rst row presents the discounted
value of unemployment ￿VU(￿): this can be interpreted as a measure of welfare because
VU(￿) is the value of participating in the labor market for a potential worker of type ￿.
Second, we present statistics about workers in ￿ exible and non-￿ exible jobs: the average
and standard deviation of the accepted wages, the employment rate and the hazard rate
out of unemployment. Third, we present statistics for unemployed workers: the average
unemployment duration and the unemployment rate. Finally, we show ￿rm pro￿ts.
8.1 Counterfactual 1: no ￿ exibility
To understand the impact of ￿ exibility, we ask how much the labor market outcomes of
women would change if ￿ exibility were not available. To answer this question, the ￿rst
policy experiments imposes that all jobs must be non-￿ exible. The equilibrium in this
environment is characterized by only one reservation value for each type
x￿ (0;￿j) = ￿VU (￿j) (28)
which is computed by solving the ￿xed point equation:





[x ￿ ￿VU (￿j)]dG(xj￿;￿) (29)
24The main explanations proposed so far have focused on the positive returns in the marriage market
(Chiappori, Iyigun and Weiss 2006 and Ge 2008).
24College High School
￿0 ￿1 ￿2 All ￿0 ￿1 ￿2 All
￿V U(￿) 7.000 15.309 2.410 6.925 3.650 3.906 2.156 3.458
Workers in non-￿ ex jobs
Mean wage 23.335 172.338 25.433 23.803 13.242 16.008 27.685 13.932
St. dev. wages 11.367 29.763 10.998 11.462 5.833 5.499 6.273 6.097
Empl. rate 0.976 0.000 0.683 0.782 0.942 0.624 0.061 0.731
Hazard rate to E 0.228 0.000 0.160 0.183 0.220 0.145 0.014 0.170
Workers in ￿ exible jobs
Mean wage . 28.392 10.730 21.880 . 8.118 11.448 10.401
St. dev. wages . 11.246 2.279 12.424 . 1.412 4.190 3.880
Empl. rate . 0.974 0.293 0.194 . 0.318 0.881 0.211
Hazard rate to E . 0.214 0.069 0.044 . 0.074 0.205 0.049
Unemployed workers
Avg. unempl. dur. 4.378 4.677 4.371 4.414 4.556 4.556 4.555 4.556
Unempl. rate 0.024 0.026 0.024 0.024 0.058 0.058 0.058 0.058
Firms￿average pro￿ts
Non-￿ ex Jobs 16.335 157.028 23.023 17.778 9.592 12.102 25.530 10.257
Flex Jobs . 13.187 8.330 11.395 . 4.222 9.318 7.716
Table 3: Benchmark Model
The implied hazard rate out of unemployment in equilibrium is:
r(h = 0;￿j) = ￿e G[￿VU (￿j)j￿;￿] (30)
In this environment fewer matches are formed. When ￿ exibility is present, a larger range
of productivities is associated with acceptable jobs. Looking at the left panel in Figure 1,
the range between x￿ (1) and x￿ (0) de￿nes productivities where only jobs with a ￿ exible
regime are accepted: if we remove this option a portion of jobs in this range will remain
un￿lled. The other non ambiguous implication of the policy is that agents valuing ￿ exibility
have a lower value of participating in the labor market because a job amenity that they
value is not available. We can measure it by comparing the present discounted value of
unemployment VU (￿j) with or without the policy.
Both of these impacts are very modest: Table 4 shows that the unemployment rate is
only 0.05 per cent higher for the college type with the highest value of ￿ exibility (￿1 in the
college sample) while the di⁄erence for the other types is negligible; the decrease in VU (￿j)
25College High School
￿0 ￿1 ￿2 All ￿0 ￿1 ￿2 All
￿V U(￿) 100.00 99.58 99.92 99.88 100.00 99.96 99.33 99.92
Workers in non-￿ ex jobs
Mean wage 100.00 16.43 82.39 98.22 100.00 83.79 44.99 94.38
St. dev. wages 100.00 38.05 104.54 101.10 100.00 107.16 93.07 96.03
Empl. rate 100.00 1412452.60 142.92 124.78 100.00 150.98 1554.81 128.85
Hazard rate to E 100.00 1411683.60 142.92 123.80 100.00 150.98 1554.81 128.86
Unemployed workers
Avg. unempl. dur. 100.00 100.06 100.00 100.01 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Unempl. rate 100.00 100.05 100.00 100.01 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Firms￿pro￿ts
Avg. pro￿t 100.00 8.32 80.55 92.60 100.00 78.58 40.40 94.50
Tot. pro￿t 100.00 9258.14 115.10 115.54 100.00 118.60 622.49 121.76
Table 4: No ￿ exibility (benchmark model=100)
is present for all the types that value ￿ exibility but the amount is still modest (between
0.04 and 0.42 per cent).
The implications for the distribution of accepted wages are ambiguous for two reasons.
First, the wages of agents with positive ￿ change in two opposite directions: the lack of
￿ exibility has a positive e⁄ect on wages up but the outside option, VU (￿j), decreases, with
a negative e⁄ect on wages. Second, the composition of the productivity distribution of
the realized non-￿ exible jobs is di⁄erent: the realized non-￿ exible jobs are on average less
productive than the realized non-￿ exible jobs in the pre-policy regime. However, they are
still on average more productive than the ￿ exible jobs in the pre-policy regime. The results,
reported in Table 4, show large changes.
The average wages for types that value ￿ exibility is reduced considerably: ranging from
16.4% of the average wage in the benchmark model for the ￿1￿type in the college sample to
83.8% for the ￿1￿type in the high school sample. This is because workers accepting ￿ exible
jobs in the benchmark model have lower productivities (given ￿) than workers accepting
non-￿ exible job. When the option of accepting ￿ exible jobs is taken away, some of these
workers accept non-￿ exible jobs, thus lowering the conditional mean wage. Accordingly, the
reservation value for accepting a non-￿ exible job in the counterfactual is the new discounted
value of unemployment ￿VU (￿j) instead of the ratio ￿j=k as in the benchmark model.
26This also implies an increase of the hazard rate from unemployment to non-￿ exible jobs.25
However, the overall hazard rate out of unemployment for the ￿1 and ￿2 types does not
increase because these workers do not have the option of transiting to ￿ exible jobs.
The impact on pro￿ts on types with a high value of ￿ exibility is large due to composition
e⁄ects. For example, the average pro￿t ￿rms make on the ￿1￿type in the college sample is
a small fraction of the pre-policy pro￿t but this is because more ￿1￿types work in ￿ exible
jobs generating a large increase in total pro￿ts.
To summarize, the impact of the presence of ￿ exibility is large on some labor market
outcomes (wages and hazard rates, redistribution of employment from ￿ exible to non-￿ exible
jobs) but small in other dimensions (unemployment). The large e⁄ect on wages may have
interesting implications for gender wage di⁄erentials.26
8.2 Counterfactual 2: reduction to the cost of ￿ exibility at zero cost to
workers
The second and third experiments consider policies that ease the provision of ￿ exible jobs
by reducing their cost. This cost reduction may be due to spillovers from technological
changes and therefore have no direct cost. Alternatively, it may result from an explicit
public policy ￿nanced by taxation. In this subsection we consider a reduction of k to one
half of its estimated value arising from technological progress that bears no cost to workers.
In this case, the ￿0￿type is una⁄ected while the ￿1 and ￿2 types are a⁄ected because
their labor market outcomes and endogenous reservation values depend on the cost of pro-
viding ￿ exibility. We compute the equilibrium using equation (17). The hazard rates for
￿1 and ￿2 are:




















We expect an increase in welfare for workers￿types that value ￿ exibility and a larger
range of productivities associated with ￿ exible jobs. Results, reported in Table 5, show that
both these e⁄ects are very small: there are negligible e⁄ects on unemployment and between
0.01 and 0.13 percentage points on workers welfare.
25The increase for the ￿1￿type in the college sample is huge. This result is because the reservation wage
for accepting a non-￿ exible job for this type of worker in the benchmark model is very high and generates
an extremely low hazard rate.
26A complete argument requires estimating men￿ s preferences for ￿ exibility, but unfortunately we do not
have enough variation in men￿ s ￿ exibility in the data to estimate the model on a sample of men.
27College High School
￿0 ￿1 ￿2 All ￿0 ￿1 ￿2 All
￿V U(￿) 100.00 100.01 100.13 100.01 100.00 100.08 100.06 100.03
Workers employed in non-￿ exible jobs
Mean wage 100.00 179.00 148.01 102.97 100.00 149.12 182.18 98.94
St. dev. wages 100.00 118.70 99.37 108.81 100.00 101.19 164.19 103.64
Empl. rate 100.00 0.24 31.73 85.47 100.00 23.47 2.46 85.06
Hazard rate to E 100.00 0.24 31.73 85.45 100.00 23.47 2.46 85.06
Workers in ￿ exible jobs
Mean wage . 99.68 150.94 96.05 . 140.68 108.00 114.17
St. dev. wages . 99.31 237.94 81.47 . 235.57 133.11 117.96
Empl. rate . 100.01 259.07 158.63 . 250.14 106.70 151.77
Hazard rate to E . 100.01 259.07 161.10 . 250.14 106.70 151.76
Unemployed workers
Avg. unemp dur 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Unempl. rate 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Firms pro￿ts
Avg (non ￿ ex) 100.00 186.70 153.02 100.52 100.00 164.95 189.11 98.69
Total (non ￿ ex) 100.00 169.73 48.63 85.93 100.00 38.80 6.40 83.96
Avg. (￿ ex) . 99.29 165.58 118.59 . 178.14 109.81 114.42
Total (￿ ex) . 99.30 428.62 188.06 . 445.21 117.17 173.60
Table 5: Half ￿ exibility cost at zero cost to workers (benchmark model = 100)
However, as in previous counterfactual experiment, the impact on wages and on the
transfer of employment from non-￿ exible to ￿ exible jobs is large. Workers of type ￿2 with
college education have an employment rate in non-￿ exible jobs that is 30% of the estimated
level; employment in ￿ exible jobs increases more than 200%. Wages increase approximately
50% for this type. Note that due to the equilibrium e⁄ects there is a big impact not only
on ￿ exible jobs, but also on the realized accepted wage distribution of non-￿ exible jobs.
This has an impact on pro￿ts. Again focusing on ￿2￿type workers with college edu-
cation we observe that average pro￿ts in non-￿ exible jobs increase because only relative
more productive matches are realized without ￿ exibility; however, there are fewer matches
without ￿ exibility leading to a decrease of total pro￿ts in this regime. Total pro￿ts for
￿ exible jobs are increase, by more than 400%, because more jobs are ￿lled in this regime
compared to the benchmark environment. Average pro￿ts also increase: the lower cost of
28providing ￿ exibility compensates the relatively worst matches that are realized.
To summarize, as in Counterfactual 1 realized wage distributions are very sensitive to
the cost of ￿ exibility, while employment and welfare are almost una⁄ected.
8.3 Counterfactual 3: reduction to the cost of ￿ exibility ￿nanced by
lump-sum tax
In the third experiment we consider a reduction in the cost of ￿ exibility ￿nanced by a lump-
sum tax on all workers. In this case all types of workers are a⁄ected. Wages and pro￿ts










leading to the following wage schedule:




x + (1 ￿ ￿)[￿VU(￿) + t ￿ ￿h] (34)
The value of unemployment equations used to compute the reservation values are, for ￿0 :





[x ￿ ￿VU (￿0) ￿ t]dG(xj￿;￿) (35)
and, for ￿1;￿2 :



















[x ￿ ￿VU (￿j) + t]dG(xj￿;￿)
For types ￿1 and ￿2; only the hazard rate from unemployment to ￿ exible jobs is a⁄ected
and it is equal to:














For type ￿0 the new hazard rate to non-￿ exible jobs re￿ ects the new reservation value:
r(h = 0;￿j) = ￿e G[￿VU (￿0) + tj￿;￿] (38)
Finally, to complete the characterization we compute the endogenous value of the tax t
used to ￿nance ￿ exibility. This depends on the realized equilibrium distribution of accepted
29wages and on how they are distributed over ￿ exible and non-￿ exible jobs. We use the
expression for the endogenous steady state unemployment rate:
u(￿0) =
￿




[r(h = 0;￿j) + r(h = 1;￿j)] + ￿
;￿j = ￿1;￿2





[(1 ￿ u(￿1))p1 + (1 ￿ u(￿1))p2] (40)
while the total tax TT is paid by all employed workers
TT = t[(1 ￿ u(￿0))p0 + (1 ￿ u(￿1))p1 + (1 ￿ u(￿2))p2] (41)
therefore: t = TE
TT which is an implicit function of t since the equilibrium unemployment
rate also depends on t.
The main di⁄erence in this experiment is that the types that do not value ￿ exibility are
a⁄ected. We expect their welfare to decrease, since they pay a tax for something that does
not bene￿t them. However, because of bargaining, they share some of this cost with ￿rms.
The results of this experiment are reported in Table 6. The impact on types ￿1 and ￿2
is very similar to the one in the second experiment: the tax generates an extremely modest
change in labor market outcomes with respect to the second experiment because the cost
of ￿ exibility is very low and therefore the tax required to ￿nance it is very low. This is
also the reason why the impact on the ￿0￿type is almost insigni￿cant. However, di⁄erently
from the second experiment, there is no Pareto improvement because type ￿0 workers pay
taxes without receiving any bene￿t. To see if their welfare loss is compensated by welfare
gains on the other two types we can use the overall value of unemployment VU(￿) which
increases by 0.01% on the college sample and by 0.03% on the high school sample.27
To summarize, as in the previous case, wages and employment distributions across
regimes are the variables most a⁄ected, while unemployment and overall welfare are not
sensitive to these policies.
As a general conclusion to the policy exercises we emphasize that despite the small
magnitude of the change in policies we are proposing, there is a large e⁄ect on wages. If a
policy objective is to impact the wage structure, then policies aimed at reducing the cost of
providing ￿ exibility could be particularly e⁄ective. We conjecture that these policies could
also signi￿cantly reduce the gender wage gap.
27Given the rounding in reporting the results the ￿0 type seems in both cases una⁄ected. It actually is
a⁄ected but the loss is in the order of the .0001% and it does not show up in the reported rounded value.
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￿0 ￿1 ￿2 All ￿0 ￿1 ￿2 All
￿V U(￿) 100.00 100.01 100.13 100.01 100.00 100.08 100.06 100.03
Workers in non-￿ exible jobs
Mean wage 99.72 179.00 148.01 102.72 100.02 148.56 181.01 98.93
St. dev. wages 100.91 118.70 99.37 109.62 100.83 102.69 143.28 104.25
Empl. rate 100.00 0.24 31.73 85.47 100.00 23.47 2.46 85.06
Hazard rate to E 100.00 0.24 31.73 85.45 100.00 23.47 2.46 85.06
Workers in ￿ exible jobs
Mean wage . 99.68 150.95 96.05 . 140.53 108.09 114.17
St. dev. wages . 99.31 237.94 81.47 . 234.98 134.74 118.95
Empl. rate . 100.01 259.07 158.63 . 250.14 106.70 151.77
Hazard rate to E . 100.01 259.07 161.10 . 250.14 106.70 151.76
Unemployed workers
Avg. unemp dur 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Unempl. rate 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Firms￿pro￿ts
Avg. (non-￿ ex) 99.60 186.70 153.02 100.19 100.03 164.20 187.84 98.67
Total (non-￿ ex) 99.60 169.73 48.63 85.64 100.03 38.62 6.36 83.94
Avg. (￿ ex) . 99.29 165.58 118.59 . 177.86 109.93 114.41
Total (￿ ex) . 99.30 428.62 188.06 . 444.51 117.30 173.58
Table 6: Half ￿ exibility cost ￿nanced by lump-sum tax (benchmark model = 100)
9 Conclusion
Studying the impact of work ￿ exibility on women￿ s labor market outcome is complicated
by the di¢ culty of ￿nding a convincing proxy for ￿ exibility and by the bias arising in
the standard settings. In this paper, we propose a contribution to a solution to the second
problem by estimating a dynamic search model of the labor market where workers and ￿rms
bargain over wages and the provision of ￿ exibility. We maintain the narrow de￿nition of
￿ exibility most frequently found in the literature - ￿ exibility as the availability of part-time
work - and show that women value this amenity signi￿cantly.
In our estimates we also ￿nd that college graduates and high school graduates value ￿ ex-
ibility di⁄erently. College graduates place higher value to having a ￿ exible jobs. Moreover,
31we ￿nd that jobs requiring a college education can provide ￿ exibility at lower cost. Because
women might choose schooling also to accommodate their preference for job ￿ exibility, we
speculate this might explain observed di⁄erences in schooling achievements between men
and women.
The counterfactual experiments reveal that the impact of ￿ exibility is quite substantial
on some labor market outcomes (wages and hazard rates, the distribution of employment
between ￿ exible and non-￿ exible jobs) but not on others (unemployment). For example,
without ￿ exibility, the average wage of workers types that value ￿ exibility would be up
to 74% lower while the unemployment rate would be at most 0.06% higher than in the
benchmark environment with ￿ exibility. We infer that policy reducing the cost of ￿ exibility
provision could be very e⁄ective to change the realized wage distribution at little cost in
terms of employment.
Our approach presents four main limitations. First, in the empirical application of our
model we de￿ne ￿ exible jobs using part-time jobs. A more appropriate de￿nition should
also capture the option of organizing work time in a ￿ exible way.
Second, we estimate the model by schooling groups and we ￿nd signi￿cant di⁄erences
between them but we did not integrate a schooling decision in the model and in the esti-
mation procedure. We think devoting future work to ￿ll this gap is particularly promising
to test our conjecture that expectations on future job amenities, such as ￿ exibility, are
important components of the schooling choices of women.
Third, the employers side in our model is very stylized. In particular we assume a
homogenous cost of providing ￿ exibility. Estimating heterogeneous costs and correlations
between costs and industries could help explain why we observe di⁄erent preference across
di⁄erent skill levels and could deepen our understanding of the feedback of the labor market
on schooling choice. Just as we ￿nd that di⁄erent levels of schooling are correlated with
preferences for ￿ exibility, we could ￿nd that di⁄erent types of schooling at same level (for
example college majors) are correlated with preferences for ￿ exibility because they increase
the likelihood of working in jobs and industries that provide ￿ exibility at low cost.
Fourth, we have found a strong impact of ￿ exibility on wages and a signi￿cant correlation
between preference for ￿ exibility and level of schooling. There is a large literature on gender
di⁄erentials on both variables which is currently facing a puzzle: recent U.S. workers data
shows women earning lower wages, despite having a positive schooling di⁄erential with
respect to men. Our results show that di⁄erences in preference and cost for ￿ exibility have
large impact on wages. Therefore, a higher preference for ￿ exibility for women with respect
to men could potentially explain a large portion of the gender wage di⁄erential. Moreover,
32if we can conclude that women choose college at least in part to obtain ￿ exibility in their
future jobs, we could also explain part of the gender college di⁄erential.
The lack of males working in ￿ exible jobs in our data prevented us to provide estimates
for men. We hope that a more complete data set providing a better de￿nition of ￿ exibility
(and possibly more detailed schooling and ￿rms information) will also generate enough data
variation to estimate the model on a sample of men.
References
[1] Altonji J. and C. Paxson (1988) "Labor Supply Preferences, Hours Constraints, and
Hours-Wage Trade-o⁄s", Journal of Labor Economics, 6(2): 254-276.
[2] Becker, G. (1967) Human Capital and the Personal Distribution of Income, Ann Arbor
MI: University of Michigan Press.
[3] Blank, R. (1990) ￿Are Part-Time Jobs Bad Jobs?￿ , in G. Burtless (ed.) A Future of
Lousy Jobs? The Changing Structure of U.S. Wages. Washington, D.C.: Brooking
Institution.
[4] Blau, D. (1991) " Search for Nonwage Job Characteristics: a Test for Reservation Wage
Hypothesis", Journal of Labor Economics, 9(2): 186-205.
[5] Bloemen, H. (2008), ￿Job Search, Hours Restrictions, and Desired Hours of Work￿ ,
Journal of Labor Economics, 26(1): 137-179.
[6] Bowlus, A. (1997), ￿A Search Interpretation of Male-Female Wage Di⁄erentials￿ , Jour-
nal of Labor Economics, 15(4), pg. 625-657.
[7] Burdett, K. and D. Mortensen (1998), ￿Wage Di⁄erentials, Employer Size, and Unem-
ployment￿ , International Economic Review, 39(2), 257-273.
[8] Chiappori, P-A., M. Iyigun and Y. Weiss (2006), ￿Investment in Schooling and the
Marriage Market￿ , IZA Discussion Paper 2454
[9] Dey, M. and C. Flinn (2005), ￿An Equilibrium Model of Health Insurance Provision
and Wage Determination￿ , Econometrica, 73: 571-627.
[10] Eckstein, Z. and G. van den Berg (2007), ￿Empirical labor search: A survey￿ , Journal
of Econometrics, 136: 531-564.
33[11] Eckstein, Z. and K. Wolpin (1995), ￿Duration to First Job and the Return to Schooling:
Estimates from a Search-Matching Model￿ , The Review of Economic Studies, 62(2):
263-286.
[12] Eckstein, Z. and K. Wolpin (1999), ￿Estimating the E⁄ect of Racial Discrimination on
First Job Wage O⁄ers￿ , The Review of Economics and Statistics, 81(3): 384-392.
[13] Flabbi, L. (2009), ￿Gender Discrimination Estimation in a Search Model with Matching
and Bargaining", forthcoming International Economic Review.
[14] Flinn, C. (2006), ￿Minimum Wage E⁄ects on Labor Market Outcomes under Search,
Bargaining and Endogenous Contact Rates￿ , Econometrica, 73: 1013-1062.
[15] Flinn, C. and J. Heckman (1982), ￿New Methods in Analyzing Structural Models of
Labor Market Dynamics￿ , Journal of Econometrics, 18: 115-168.
[16] Ge, S. (2008) ￿Women￿ s College Decisions: How Much Does Marriage Matter?￿ ,
mimeo, Virginia Tech.
[17] Golden, L. (2001) "Flexible Work Schedules: What are we trading o⁄ to get them?",
Monthly Labor Review, March.
[18] Gronberg, T. and R. Reed (1988) "Estimating Workers￿Marginal Willingness to Pay
for Job Attributes using Duration Data", Journal of Human Resources, 29: 911-931.
[19] Hwang, H., D. Mortensen and R. Reed (1998) "Hedonic Wages and Labor Market
Search", Journal of Labor Economics, 16(4): 815-847.
[20] Lang K. and S. Majumdar (2004) "The Pricing of Job Characteristics When Markets
Do Not Clear: Theory and Policy Implications", International Economic Review, 45(4):
1111-1128.
[21] Mo¢ tt, R. ￿The Estimation of a Joint Wage-Hours Labor Supply Model￿ , Journal of
Labor Economics, 2(4): 550-566.
[22] Rosen, S. (1974) "Hedonic Prices and Implicit Markets: Product Di⁄erentiation in
Pure Competition￿ , Journal of Political Economy, 82: 34-55.
[23] Postel-Vinay, F. and J-M Robin, ￿Equilibrium Wage Dispersion with Worker and Em-
ployer Heterogeneity￿ , Econometrica, 70(6), (2002) 2295-2350.
34[24] Rosen, S. (1986) "The Theory of Equalizing Di⁄erences" in: Handbook of Labor Eco-
nomics, V. 1 (O. Ashenfelter and R. Layard, eds.), Amsterdam: North-Holland.
[25] Scandura, T. and M. Lankau (1997) "Relationship of gender, family responsability and
￿ exible work hours to organizational commitment and job satisfaction", Journal of
Organizational Behavior, 18: 377-391.
[26] Topel, R. (1986) "Local Labor Markets", Journal of Political Economy, 94: S111-S143.
[27] Usui, E. (2006) "Gender Occupational Segregation in an Equilibrium Search Model",
mimeo, Wayne State University.
35A Appendix
A.1 Derivation of Value Functions
The value of employment at wage w and ￿ exibility regime h for an agent with preference ￿
working at a ￿rm with ￿ exibility cost k is given by the following discrete time approximation:
VE (w;h;￿;k) = (42)
(w + ￿h)￿t + ￿(￿t)[(1 ￿ ￿￿t)VE (w;h;￿;k) + ￿￿tVU(￿) + o(￿t)]
where ￿t denotes a time span. This expression states that the value of employment is given
by the utility received in the entire period plus the discounted expected value of remaining
at the job or of falling in the unemployment state. Other possible events are happening
with a negligible probability o(￿t). Assuming ￿(￿t) = (1 + ￿￿t)
￿1 ; rearranging terms and
dividing both sides by ￿t, we obtain:
(1 + ￿￿t)
￿t













Since the Poisson process assumption implies that lim￿t!0
o(￿t)
￿t = 0, when ￿t ￿! 0 the
previous expression converges to:
￿VE (w;h;￿;k) = w + ￿h ￿ ￿VE (w;h;￿;k) + ￿VU(￿) (44)
After collecting terms, this equation is equivalent to (3).





(1 ￿ ￿￿t)VU(￿) + ￿￿t
Z
max[VE (w;h;￿;k);VU(￿)]dG(x) + o(￿t)
￿
This expression states that the value of unemployment is given by the total (dis)utility from
unemployment over the period, equal to b(￿)￿t; and by the the fact that after a period ￿t
two main events may happen: not meeting any ￿rm and remain unemployed or meeting a
￿rm, extract a match-speci￿c productivity value x and decide if accept the job o⁄er or not.

















36Takin the limit to continuous time this expression becomes:
￿VU(￿) = b(￿) ￿ ￿VU (￿) + ￿
Z
max[VE (w;h;￿;k);VU(￿)]dG(x) (47)
leading to equation (4) when we collect terms.
Finally, the value of a ￿lled job for a ￿rm with technology k paying a wage w; o⁄ering
a ￿ exibility regime h to an agent with preference ￿ is:
VF (pr;h;￿;k) = (48)
[(1 ￿ kh)x ￿ w]￿t + ￿(￿t)[(1 ￿ ￿￿t)0 + ￿￿tVF (pr;h;￿;k) + o(￿t)]
Notice that the dependence on the worker￿ s preference is through the wage schedule,which
depends on ￿ after the bargaining game is solved. Applying the assumption on the discount
function ￿(￿t) and rearranging we get:
(1 + ￿￿t)
￿t










and taking limits to continuous time:
￿VF (pr;h;￿;k) = [(1 ￿ kh)x ￿ w] + ￿VF (pr;h;￿;k) (50)
leading to equation (5) when we collect terms.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. By de￿nition of the reservation values:
x￿￿ ￿ x￿ (0) ()
￿
k
￿ ￿VU(￿) () ￿ ￿ k￿VU(￿)
Also by de￿nition of the reservation values we obtain:
x￿ (0) ￿ x￿ (1) () ￿VU(￿) ￿
￿VU(￿) ￿ ￿
1 ￿ k
() ￿ ￿ k￿VU (￿)
proving the claim.
A.3 Matched Moments
The following table illustrates the moments in the data and simulated moments at the
estimated parameter values. The moments that are being matched are: mean and standard
deviation of wages of workers in non-￿ exible jobs, the fraction of workers in ￿ exible jobs,
mean and standard deviation of wages of workers in ￿ exible jobs. Quintiles are de￿ned
using percentiles 0, 20, 40, 60, 80, and 100 of the non-￿ exible workers￿wage distribution.
37Non-￿ exible jobs Flexible jobs
Sample Mean wages St. dev. wages Prop. workers Mean wages
￿ St. dev. wages
￿
Estim. Data Estim. Data Estim Data Estim. Data Estim. Data
All College 23.715 23.410 11.302 10.360 0.191 0.200 21.836 22.490 12.784 14.152
Quintile 1 12.297 12.032 1.976 2.273 0.311 0.311 3.495 3.447 2.491 2.470
Quintile 2 16.858 17.085 1.124 1.106 0.118 0.122 2.020 2.131 1.798 1.911
Quintile 3 21.141 21.134 1.270 1.352 0.128 0.071 2.701 1.528 2.374 1.469
Quintile 4 26.587 26.574 1.857 2.080 0.163 0.190 4.368 5.037 3.683 4.144
Quintile 5 39.222 39.910 7.783 8.196 0.197 0.195 7.819 8.021 6.483 6.714
All High Sc. 13.933 13.879 6.097 5.923 0.218 0.219 10.512 10.294 3.918 4.279
Quintile 1 7.321 7.532 1.179 1.253 0.379 0.369 2.744 2.765 1.768 1.798
Quintile 2 10.301 10.091 0.718 0.731 0.276 0.277 2.757 2.769 2.008 2.026
Quintile 3 12.718 12.735 0.736 0.770 0.145 0.144 1.846 1.843 1.590 1.609
Quintile 4 15.640 15.559 1.004 1.139 0.146 0.144 2.273 2.223 1.956 1.945
Quintile 5 22.452 22.392 3.974 4.137 0.089 0.084 1.760 1.780 1.622 1.703
￿Because some quintiles may not display any worker in ￿ exible jobs for some parameter
values and because identi￿cation relies on the fractions of ￿ exible and non-￿ exible job
workers with overlapping wage support, means and standard deviations of wages in ￿ exible
jobs were multiplied by the corresponding fraction of workers in ￿ exible job (except for the
row displaying moments for all workers).
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